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Thank you very much for that gracious introduction, Michael; 
and thank you to the organizers and hosts of the conference for invit-
ing me to speak to you today.  I can conceive of no higher honor 
than to be asked by one’s professional peers to address them on top-
ics central to their scholarly interests, and I am thus at once grateful 
to you all for that honor and humbled by the task.  I am humbled be-
cause the people in this room—and certainly the people who at-
tended this conference, some of whom understandably have now re-
turned to their home cities—collectively are the most gifted and 
knowledgeable students of juridical proof and epistemology that have 
ever been gathered together under one roof.  Many of you are young 
scholars and think perhaps my comments do not apply to you, but 
they most assuredly do.  Your entrance into this field brings with it a 
level of academic preparation that is accelerating the transformation 
of the field.  I have been engaged with the study of evidence for close 
to thirty years and have seen close up of what I speak.  For the first 
half of my career evidence was both a research and teaching backwa-
ter, the teaching to be done by whoever was at hand, and the re-
search relegated to the chroniclers of the post-Wigmore era fasci-
nated by such deep questions as whether a statement of state of mind 
was not hearsay or an exception to the hearsay rule.  In the mid-80s 
the complacent view that all the interesting work in the field was 
done—much like the proposals at the end of the nineteenth century 
to close the patent office because everything that could had already 
been invented1—was exploded first by the probability debates that 
moved to the fore the deep questions of rationality and showed that 
 ∗ John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University.  This speech 
was delivered at the Association of American Law Schools Evidence Conference held 
in Cleveland, Ohio, on June 6, 2008. 
 1 This possibly apocryphal quotation is often attributed to former Patent Com-
missioner Charles H. Duell.  See Samuel Sass, A Patently False Patent Myth, 13 SKEPTICAL 
INQUIRER 310 (1989). 
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they had not been resolved,2 followed by the recognition of the con-
textual nature of human inference, thus opening up the Pandora’s 
box of the inadequacy of simple models of knowledge as justified true 
belief and of truth amounting to correspondence with an external, 
observer-independent (more or less) reality, whatever their philoso-
phical charms.  This opened the field to the influences of all forms of 
social constructivism, from the Nobel Prize winning work of Kahne-
man and Tversky,3 to empirical studies of fact finding, to what some-
what ironically are now classic forms of critical theory.4
To you youngsters out there, none of this is new, which is exactly 
my point about the level of scholarly preparation you now bring to 
the field of evidence.  And of course you are able to bring this level of 
preparation to bear because of the astonishing transformation of the 
field of evidence—attributable to your recent predecessors—that has 
occurred over the last quarter century that has made clear that the 
field of evidence, perhaps like the double helix of DNA fame, wraps 
around the deepest empirical and philosophical questions of our 
time, questions that we are all now engaged in studying from a won-
derful cacophony of perspectives.  With great respect to the former 
giants of the field, such as my predecessor at Northwestern Univer-
sity, John Henry Wigmore, the field of evidence today is at a level of 
creativity and contributions to knowledge unmatched in its history. 
And interestingly, almost all of that work is being done in what is 
one of the jewels in the crown of western civilization: the American 
universities.  While I do not purport to be a comparative law scholar, 
one looks for both conceptual insights and analytical tools where one 
can, and no matter what the language there is simply nothing in the 
West remotely comparable to the research programs of the people in 
this room.  There are a few people here and there, England in par-
ticular, and a few elsewhere, pursuing interesting research, but these 
are exceptions. 
I confess I should be somewhat more diffident than I appear in 
discussing the East, for there are vast areas of the world of which I, 
 2 See, e.g., Symposium, Decision and Inference Litigation, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 
(1991); Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 377 
(1986). 
 3 Kaheman and Tversky’s work on prospect theory would win Kaheman the No-
bel Prize in Economics in 2002.  See Daniel Kaheman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: 
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
 4 See, e.g., Aviva A. Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utter-
ance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159 (1997).  There are powerful fe-
minist critiques of Crawford itself.  Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domes-
tic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
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and indeed all of us, are largely ignorant.  I am aware of the state of 
affairs in the two great eastern cultures—Japan and China.  I put 
aside India because of its British influence.  In Japan, a new genera-
tion of young scholars largely trained at American universities—
Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, and others—is as we speak intro-
ducing the study of evidence to the country.  In China, I have been 
involved with a group commissioned by the People’s Supreme Court 
to create out of whole cloth a rational regulation of evidence at trial.  
I say whole cloth advisedly because of the devastating impact of the 
Cultural Revolution that wiped out knowledge of western legal sys-
tems in China.  Lawyers and judges were among the most virulently 
attacked during Mao’s madness, with many executed, thousands ban-
ished, law schools closed, and books burned.5  When Deng Xiaoping 
uttered in 1992 what is probably the most significant single sentence 
any human being has ever uttered, “To be rich is glorious,”6 it un-
leashed economic reform in China that has led to its ongoing capital-
ist transformation.  It was not long, however, before the Chinese Gov-
ernment realized that the creation of wealth required a legal system 
that enforced rights and obligations, but there was no such system in 
place and no legal knowledge adequate to create one.  To rectify this, 
the Government sent out waves of scholars from Chinese universities 
to study in many different countries, including with me at Northwest-
ern, and to bring back to China hopefully useful knowledge.  In the 
field of evidence, the American approach has provisionally won out, 
which is interesting because, to the extent there is a recognizable 
western influence on the Chinese legal system, it is Germanic.  Two 
years ago, the Supreme People’s Court directed the preparation of a 
model uniform code of evidence.  It has now been promulgated, and 
the Court has ordered its provisional adoption in six judicial districts.  
In July of 2009, a conference will be held in Beijing to appraise the 
results of the field test and hopefully pave the way for the universal 
adoption of the evidence code.7
 5 See, e.g., Cynthia Losure Baraban, Note, Inspiring Global Professionalism: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities for American Lawyers in China, 73 IND. L.J. 1247, 1257 (“[I]n 
1966, Mao set out to destroy the entire legal culture.  During the next ten years, a 
period known as the Cultural Revolution, Mao . . . . closed all law schools and de-
clared lawyers to be counterrevolutionaries and criminals. . . .  Many Chinese lawyers 
were executed or sent to labor camps to work in primitive conditions.”).  See also 
RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 347 (2002) (de-
scribing the hardships faced by lawyers during the Cultural Revolution). 
 6 See, e.g., Cheng Li, Revolution Is No Dinner Party, but China’s Reform Is (1999), 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/red.giant/communism/. 
 7 Welcome Address: Scientific Theory and Evidence Seminar, http://www.icelfs. 
com/English/newsList.aspx?id=115&n_kind=1 (last visited Dec. 24, 2008). 
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So, I return to why I address you with some diffidence.  Unlike 
the famous quote when President John F. Kennedy welcomed forty-
nine Nobel Prize winners to the White House in 1962 and said he 
thought it was “the most extraordinary collection of talent, of human 
knowledge, that has ever been gathered together at the White House, 
with the possible exception of when Thomas Jefferson dined alone,”8 
you are the most extraordinary collection of talent and knowledge 
pertaining to juridical proof that the world has ever seen.  Two things 
at least are responsible for this, in addition to your own interests.  
One is our jury system, of course, that divides responsibility for fact 
finding over various actors, thus necessitating the systemic treatment 
of evidence. But the other is these great American universities that 
provide you the opportunity to engage in the work that you are do-
ing.  Nowhere else in the world would you have comfortable salaries, 
a surplus of free time, and encouragement to engage in this kind of 
work, and frankly, if nothing else I say today has any effect or signifi-
cance—and of course the primary point I have been making so far is 
that it is not at all clear what I could contribute to your knowledge 
and understanding—I hope that at least each of you will reflect, how-
ever briefly, on how such privilege carries with it a deep responsibility 
to increase, however incrementally, the store of human knowledge 
through your research and perpetuate it through your teaching. 
How does all this tie to the Enlightenment?  And from that cha-
otic human period to the recent Supreme Court cases of Crawford 
and Holmes?9  Good question.  And the answer is the primacy of facts, 
which is the central concern of the field of evidence.  Facts are pri-
mary in any coherent study of evidence, obviously, but they are pri-
mary in an even deeper manner for they are the foundation upon 
which western civilization rests.  Even though the field of evidence 
has undergone a renaissance, it still lacks the panache and status of 
constitutional law, yet in my opinion it is both more fundamental and 
more important. Those, surely, seem like rather bold claims, and I 
wonder how many of you would have agreed with them prior to to-
day.  I think if you asked most well-educated citizens, including law 
professors, what best characterizes our form of government and its 
handmaiden the legal system, the answer typically would have some-
 8 See MAURICE ISSERMAN & MICHAEL KAZAN, AMERICA DIVIDED: THE CIVIL WAR OF 
THE 1960s, at 61 (2004). 
 9 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 
U.S. 319 (2006).  Crawford has been the subject of so much scholarship that I have 
kept citations to the bare minimum.  To be fair to the academy would require a foot-
note of references two or three pages long.  Interestingly, Holmes has been the sub-
ject of virtually no scholarship, which is yet another reason for stringent citations. 
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thing to do with constitutionalism on the one hand and, on the oth-
er, rights and obligations.  You might say something about the rule of 
law, and if you were attempting to impress you might refer to the cen-
tral contribution of the Magna Carta to Anglo-American forms of 
government that even the King was bound by the law—and you might 
of course bemoan the damage you think done to that concept by the 
Bush Administration.  If you really got into it, you might fast forward 
to the Enlightenment and point out that what was nascent in 1215 in 
English history became explicit in the eighteenth century when En-
lightenment thinkers inverted the old order of things to make the 
state the servant of the people, rather than the other way around.10  
And you might end your disquisition with the astonishing rhetorical 
flourish of quoting the last, deeply moving letter written by Thomas 
Jefferson on June 24, 1826, to Roger C. Weightman, in which with 
palpable regret Mr. Jefferson had to decline the invitation to travel to 
Washington, D.C., to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the signing 
of the Declaration of Independence: 
[M]ay it [the Declaration of Independence] be to the world, what 
I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but fi-
nally to all,) the Signal of arousing men to burst the chains under 
which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them 
to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings & security of self-
government. . . .  All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of 
man.  [T]he general spread of the light of science has already laid 
open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind 
has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few 
booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace 
of god.11
Indeed, the creation of the United States, with its rule of law, se-
paration of powers, limited and shared government, and its articula-
tion of various individual rights in the body of the Constitution and 
its Bill of Rights is sometimes seen as the crowning achievement of 
 10 The idea of the state as social contract entered into by its citizens was of course 
popularized by John Locke.  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Las-
lett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).  Notably, Madison relied greatly on the 
shift from a sovereign government to a sovereign people in justifying his opposition 
to the Alien and Sedition Acts.  JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS 
(1800), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 141 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds., 1987).  For a general overview of enlightenment thought, see ERNST 
CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Fritz C.A. Koelln & James P. Pet-
tegrove trans., 1951) (1932). 
 11 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger Weightman (June 24, 1826) (material 
is quoted exactly as it appeared in Mr. Jefferson’s letter, except for the bracketed 
terms), available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/214.html. 
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the Enlightenment in which the potential of rationality to improve 
the human condition finally reached full flower.  The significance of 
the political side of the Enlightenment can even be seen in the fa-
mous essay by Immanuel Kant that named the period to which he 
contributed much, “What is Enlightenment?,”12 in which the answer 
that he gave to the question was simply freedom to use one’s own in-
telligence.  His opening paragraph captures its main theme: 
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from self imposed immaturity 
for which he himself was responsible. Immaturity and depend-
ence are the inability to use one’s own intellect without the direc-
tion of another. One is responsible for this immaturity and de-
pendence, if its cause is not a lack of intelligence, but a lack of 
determination and courage to think without the direction of an-
other. Sapere aude! Dare to know! is therefore the slogan of the 
Enlightenment.13
In my opinion, and with all due respect to Mr. Jefferson and the Dec-
laration of Independence, the right to think without the direction of 
another reached its zenith in the brilliant innovation of the U.S. Con-
stitution that memorialized sovereignty possessed by the people with 
rights granted to the government rather than being an attribute of 
government that permitted it to impress its will upon its subjects. 
But, here is the critical point, or rather the background to the 
critical point: the political side of the Enlightenment grew out of its 
epistemological revolution, which finally saw the supplanting of 
dogmatic and revelatory sources of knowledge with rational empiri-
cism.14  To be sure, any Reader’s Digest-like review of complex phe-
nomena, such as I am engaging in here, will be rough and crude.  For 
example, English empiricism traces its roots at least to Francis Bacon, 
and one can argue whether he should be thought of as the end of the 
Renaissance or the beginning of the Enlightenment.  Whatever.  By 
the time of the American Revolution, it was the promise of the appli-
cation of systematic thinking of the kind that had revolutionized what 
we call science and they called natural philosophy that was being put 
to use to revolutionize the relationship between the state and the citi-
zen.  But, and here is truly the critical point, the significance of em-
piricism goes much deeper than just lending tools of rational inquiry 
to political science.  The work product of political science depends 
 12 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (1784), re-
printed in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 54 (H.S. Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2nd ed. 
1991). 
 13 Id. 
 14 See, e.g., Gary Hatfield, Epistemology, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT10–20 (Alan Charles Kors ed., 2005). 
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on rational empiricism, or more startlingly put, factual accuracy is 
more fundamental than rights and obligations because, conversely, 
they are parasitic on factual accuracy. 
Take a simple example, but one at the heart of the political and 
epistemological currents we are discussing—the existence of prop-
erty.  What does it mean to own something—like the shirts, blouses, 
pants, and dresses that each of you is wearing?  The conventional, 
law-schoolesque answer is that you have the right to possess, alienate, 
control, and consume that physical item.  Fine.  But what happens 
when I demand that you give me the shirt off your back because I as-
sert it is mine?  You will scurry around and find a fact finder to whom 
you will present evidence of sale, gift, creation, discovery, whatever, to 
convince the fact finder that the universe was in a certain state at a 
certain time such that you rather than I have the right to possess, 
consume, etcetera. 
Generalize this point.  Rights and obligations of any sort whatso-
ever are meaningless without accurate fact finding.  It doesn’t matter 
whether the question is the age of the President, the powers distrib-
uted to different branches of government, the right to be free from 
torture, or your rights to possess, consume, and dispose of your 
clothes.  It is the attachment of rights and obligations to the bedrock 
of facts—to how the universe actually was at a particular moment in 
time—that gives them substance.  This is the single most significant 
feature distinguishing western liberal democracies and their market 
economies from eastern autocratic states and their centralized econ-
omies—and the consequences are obvious and predictable. 
Thus, those who study and advance our knowledge of evidence 
are not just arguing over the proper conception of statements about 
states of mind but instead laying the ground work for the progression 
of western civilization.  Nothing is more fundamental than the work 
that you all do in your classes and your research, for without it every-
thing is vanity. 
Now to Crawford15 and Holmes.16  These two cases are fascinating 
for many reasons.  They pose interesting doctrinal questions about 
confrontation and the regulation of the inferential process at trial, 
Crawford holding that testimonial statements at trial may be used only 
if the accused has or has had the right to confront the person making 
the statements, and Holmes concluding that due process is violated by 
excluding plausible evidence that a third party committed a crime 
 15 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 16 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
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whenever the State’s evidence against the defendant is “strong.”  
They pose perhaps even more interesting questions about the nature 
of constitutional interpretation generally, and they pose startling 
questions about the significance of accurate fact finding at trial.  Most 
interestingly of all, excluding the doctrinal holdings, the answers they 
give to each of these questions are quite at odds with each other. 
To discuss the first question—the nature of constitutional inter-
pretation—I must replace my evidence with my constitutional crimi-
nal procedure hat.  To summarize what I will briefly discuss, as a gen-
eral matter, and certainly as applicable to these two cases, in my years 
of teaching and writing in the field of constitutional criminal proce-
dure, the only good theory of any general import that I have come 
across is Oliver Wendell Holmes’s general proposition that no gen-
eral proposition is worth a damn,17 not at least to the questions that 
have risen to the Supreme Court since the beginning of the proce-
dural revolution in the late 1950s.  We have to do another Reader’s Di-
gest approach to complicated questions, but please bear with me.  
Roughly and crudely put, there are five general approaches to consti-
tutional exegesis: 
A. Text (literalism) 
B. Originalism (meaning, intent, linguistic historicism gen-
erally) 
C. Structural questions (e.g. separation of powers) 
D. History 
E. Policy (utility, morality, whatever)18 
So far as I can see, we can put aside structural issues, leaving us four.  
“Policy” is actually the opposite of an interpretive theory because it 
does the opposite of what interpretative theories are supposed to do, 
which is constrain decision.  Thus, we are down to three, and none of 
them help very much in deciding the cases the Court is deciding to-
day for a quite general and pervasive reason: today’s world bears al-
most no relationship to that of 1791 or 1868.  Moreover, there is no 
evidence, literally none, that what was uppermost on any of the draft-
ers’ or ratifiers’ minds in dealing with individual rights was a general 
theoretical approach to a problem rather than provisions dealing 
with discrete, highly-contextualized political problems. 
 17 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollack (Sept. 9, 1904), in 2 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 59 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941). 
 18 For considerably more sophisticated detail, see PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) and PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). 
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Just to set the stage, consider wiretapping.  Electromagnetic 
transmittal of information was not even dreamt of in 1791, and, to 
the extent it existed in 1868, it had no claim to privacy—telegraph 
wires were open and anyone could receive a signal.  What sense can 
even be made, then, of the question, “How does the Fourth Amend-
ment—or the Due Process Clause—apply to wiretapping?”  Whatever 
answer one gives will have to be made up.  As I will return to in just a 
minute, one can make up better or worse answers, but they will still 
be made up. 
Now consider the world of 1791.  Criminal cases in England in 
the century preceding 1791 consisted roughly of three types: state tri-
als for treason, political and religious persecution, and run of the mill 
criminality.  There were certain abusive procedures employed in the 
first two categories that were plainly on the minds of the founding 
generation, such as the prosecution of Walter Raleigh,19 oaths ex offi-
cio prior to formal charges or the disclosure of allegations,20 torture 
and so on, but these were essentially nonexistent in the third category 
of crime, which involved private rather than state prosecution.  
Moreover, counsel not only was not the norm in common criminal 
cases but in many instances was disallowed.  Those cases were basi-
cally all eyewitness cases with no investigative resources allocated to 
either side.  Cross-examination was known, but without counsel or 
other aids it did not amount to much.  Moreover, the highly skilled 
and intense examination that we use the phrase “cross-examination” 
to refer to is largely a product of the nineteenth century.  And in any 
event, in cases of felony, the Marian statutes required committing 
magistrates to take formal statement of witnesses, and those state-
ments were admissible at trial if the witness was unavailable.21  As 
Tom Davies has demonstrated, the Marian statutes were part of the 
law the colonies inherited from Britain.22
Again, think Reader’s Digest, for there are immense complexities 
here, but nonetheless, as the Court in Crawford rather candidly said, 
“The most notorious instances of civil-law examination occurred in 
the great political trials of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”23  
 19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
 20 And there is some historical evidence that the “point” of the Sixth Amendment 
was to ensure the validity of charges, i.e., that accusers had actually made them.  Jer-
emy A. Blumenthal, Comment, Reading the Text of the Confrontation Clause: “To Be” or 
“Not to Be”?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 722 (2001). 
 21 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
 22 Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know t? Fic-
tional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005).
 23 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
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And the abuses that were prevalent were abusive indeed, such as Ra-
leigh being marched to his death without Lord Cobham being 
brought from the Tower.24  Or consider another case that figures 
large in the Crawford opinion: “Fenwick’s counsel objected to admit-
ting the examination of a witness who had been spirited away, on the 
ground that Fenwick had had no opportunity to cross-examine.”25  By 
contrast, in run-of-the-mill felony cases, witness statements were regu-
larly used. 
Now, think about the implications of this for our three remain-
ing sources of constitutional interpretation—text, originalism, and 
history.  First, there is literally no applicable text with any determi-
nate meaning in Holmes.  Much like Griswold v. Connecticut’s26 flailing 
away in a search for pertinent text, the Court in Holmes said, “This la-
titude [to control the admission of evidence], however, has limits. 
‘Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses 
of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal de-
fendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”27  
Somewhere, in short, we find this idea, which is not, I would think, 
very comforting for those committed to textual sources. 
The Confrontation Clause, by contrast, is sometimes suggested 
to be clear in its application to a case like Crawford, although to its 
credit the Court acknowledges to the contrary.  And the Court is 
right, although for reasons that, in my opinion, the Court does not 
give.  As some have noted, the Confrontation Clause, like the entire 
Sixth Amendment, is in the passive voice with the elided phrase being 
“by the Government,” presumably.  Thus, what the clause means to 
“literalist”—how can anyone emending language to give it meaning 
be a literalist?—is that “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him [by the government].”28  
Yet the “literal language” of the Sixth Amendment is supposed to say, 
“The defendant has the right to cross-examine the witnesses against 
him.”  Those are obviously quite different and, if the latter was truly 
meant, it easily could have been said. 
At a somewhat higher level of generality, the modern problem 
has nothing to do with allegations of treason and political or religious 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 45 (citing Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591–92 (H.C. 1696)). 
 26 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding the right to privacy in the “penumbras” and 
“emanations” of the Bill of Rights). 
 27 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 319 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (2006)). 
 28 U.S. CONST. amend VI.  
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persecution.  The modern problem is standard criminality ranging, 
to be sure, from the petty to the serious, but still it is not focused on 
cases like Raleigh’s or the use of governmental power to suppress 
matters of conscience.  Moreover, all cases are surrounded by a web 
of procedural protection that was unthinkable in 1791 and 1868: the 
right to counsel, appeal, investigatory assistance, limits on interroga-
tion, discovery, public and speedy trial rights, limits on the use of pre-
judicial evidence, restrictions on judicial control of jury verdicts, and 
on and on.  I suggest it is literally a nonsensical question to ask what 
the fixed meaning of the language of the Sixth Amendment is as ap-
plied to this entity that previously did not exist and was not contem-
plated.  Moreover, to the extent the modern trial has a historical ana-
logue, it is to the trial of common-place felonies in which witness 
statements were widely used. 
Going up the generality chain, the Confrontation Clause is part 
of the Sixth Amendment, and read as a whole the Sixth Amendment 
plainly is directed precisely at cases like Raleigh, the political persecu-
tions of the royal courts, and the religious persecutions of the High 
Commission.  What justification there is to take this one clause out of 
context in the service of an illusive literalism, ignoring its surround-
ings that give it meaning if anything does, is completely unclear. 
What I have said of textualism presages and perhaps disposes of 
originalism and historicism, at least so far as Crawford is concerned.  
The text is unhelpful because the problems being addressed were dif-
ferent; there is neither original meaning to capture nor any pertinent 
historical evidence.  If the Government today were to try a case solely 
through affidavits or having “spirited away” a significant witness to 
stop him from being examined in court, it would be a different mat-
ter.  But those historical abuses bear no relationship to what is at 
stake today in American criminal procedure.  Moreover, there is a 
critical difference between a right and its implementation.  It is one 
thing for the government to affirmatively deny the defendant access 
to information; it is quite another for the government not to affirma-
tively provide it:  the First Amendment does not mean government 
must subsidize speech; individuals can waive the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments without knowing they have the right not to; the right to 
procreate does not mean that the government must assist in the 
process; the right to life is not violated when government does not 
protect you;29 and so on.  Crawford itself is a perfect example: how can 
anyone claim that the government denied him access to his wife?  In 
 29 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
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any event, we have literally no knowledge of how any drafter or rati-
fier of the Constitution would react to anything like the facts of Craw-
ford or 911 calls, or statements by minors concerning sexual abuse, or 
lab reports, and especially not in the context of modern criminal 
procedure which guarantees much more than the drafters ever would 
have imagined. 
At the highest level of generality, Crawford also embodies the 
deep philosophical question of the relationship between a rule and 
its underlying reasons.  Suppose that you were convinced that the 
Confrontation Clause was designed to stop cases like Raleigh.  What 
do you suppose the problem might have been?  Simply that cross-
examination had not occurred and, thus, that it would have been fine 
to call Cobham and then cut off Walter’s head?  Or do you suppose 
that the problem was that Raleigh faced trumped up charges that 
would have likely been exposed had Cobham been called?  These 
questions answer themselves.  There is no reason to think that the 
Sixth Amendment reflects a fetish for cross-examination rather than 
a concern about reliability during a time when unreliable outcomes 
were relatively easy to manufacture.  What, then, is the meaning of 
the Amendment?  Is it that each of the identified procedures must be 
provided regardless of the effect on reliability, or is that they were a 
rough estimation made 217 years ago in drastically different times of 
what might be useful palliatives to stop the abuses of the time?  And if 
the latter, what is the rule that emerges that should be applied in our 
time and under our conditions?  Is it these particularized procedures 
ripped from their historical context, or is it the underlying rationale 
that animates them?  This is not an easy question, for the answer that 
one gravitates to—that reasons should dominate—has the capacity to 
make rules superfluous.  Still, the farther one gets from the actual 
conditions anticipated by the rule, the greater the justification for 
looking to its animating spirit. 
Interestingly, the procedure in Holmes, as described by the 
Court, was so weird that it too had no obvious analogues in historical 
practice.  As described by the Court: 
[u]nder this rule, the trial judge does not focus on the probative 
value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the defense 
evidence of third-party guilt. Instead, the critical inquiry concerns 
the strength of the prosecution's case: If the prosecution’s case is 
strong enough, the evidence of third-party guilt is excluded even 
if that evidence, if viewed independently, would have great proba-
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tive value and even if it would not pose an undue risk of harass-
ment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.30
Quite frankly, this seems more like a violation of the literal text of the 
Sixth Amendment than do the facts of Crawford, as it denies the right 
to present a defense.  As to originalism and history, the lack of a clear 
textual source for the constitutional command the Court constructs is 
pretty good evidence of equivalent lack of any evidence of either, and 
the Court produces literally none. 
That leaves policy, and here the cases stand in interesting and 
stark contrast.  Holmes advances factual accuracy, and Crawford almost 
surely retards it.  It is almost surely the case that Crawford himself was 
guilty, and the cases coming in the wake of Crawford are not indicative 
of an abusive government trying to frame innocent people.  The real 
question seems to be how far commitment to the peculiar form of 
constitutional exegesis found in Crawford will be allowed to get in the 
way of sensible outcomes.  This is not to say that the reliability stan-
dard of Ohio v. Roberts31 did not result in erroneous outcomes; it is 
merely to say that, comparing the pre- and post-Crawford regimes, it is 
hard to see how factual accuracy will be advanced.  The exact oppo-
site is true of Holmes; indeed, it is hard to fathom what might have 
possessed the courts of South Carolina. 
There are other interesting policy differences between Holmes 
and Crawford.  All Holmes commits one to is the right of a defendant 
to present a defense.  The Court was at pains to point out that the 
conventional regulation of the evidentiary process was not at stake; 
thus, rules like FRE 403 or 413 through 41532 are not called into ques-
tion.  There will be some ambiguity at the edges of wholesale and re-
tail regulation of the evidentiary process, but probably not very much. 
Crawford, by contrast, commits one to an astonishing roll back of 
modern criminal procedure jurisprudence.  As Donald Dripps has 
developed in detail,33 the interpretive methodology of Crawford of 
searching for some foregone historical meaning would emasculate 
the entire line of right to counsel cases from Gideon34 forward—
indeed from Powell 35 forward.  It also makes mincemeat out of Miran-
 30 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 320. 
 31 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 32 FED. R. EVID. 403, 413–15. 
 33 Donald Dripps, Sixth Amendment Originalism’s Collision Course with the Right to 
Counsel: What’s Titanic, What’s Iceberg? (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper No. 07-79, 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952508. 
 34 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 35 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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da,36 for which there are no historical analogues from either 1791 or 
1868.  Habeas corpus would revert to being limited to challenging 
the jurisdiction of the incarcerating authority.  Brady v. Maryland 37 
would be a dead letter, as would almost all of the post-Katz38 Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.  It is rather hard to say with a straight face that 
textualism, originalism, or historicism result in the regulation of 
something nobody thought about until one hundred or so years later.  
Perhaps it is some solace that capital punishment would survive un-
scathed, whether conducted by lethal injection, hanging, or firing 
squad.  Oh, yes, and challenges to the racial makeup of grand and 
petit juries would not be allowed. 
Perhaps all this is simply the cost of other advantages that may 
flow from the decision—after all, factual accuracy is not the exclusive 
concern—but only two have been identified.  One is that the holding 
of Ohio v. Roberts39 was ambiguous, which is certainly true.  Whether 
this is a benefit depends on the alternative, and it is becoming pain-
fully obvious that the Crawford regime will be subject to just as much, 
if not more, ambiguity as what it replaces.40  Indeed, we now have the 
spectacle of deciding what is testimonial by the oxymoronic standard 
of what, objectively speaking, the primary purpose of a govern-
ment/citizen interaction might be.  If it is to yield help, resulting 
statements are not testimonial; if it is to investigate, they are. 
Those of you who do not study constitutional criminal proce-
dure might justifiably wonder where this weird standard has come 
from.  What can it possibly mean to look at what, objectively speaking, 
someone’s internal motivations might be?  And where in the Consti-
tution is that peculiar line drawn?  The answer is that this is an effort 
to borrow from the Fourth Amendment special needs cases,41 where 
the primary purpose of legislation or general law enforcement tech-
niques can determine the constitutionality of state action.  At the 
same time, the Court has rigorously avoided allowing the subjective 
state of mind of individual officers to be the determining criterion, 
precisely because of the daunting task of piercing the mind of an-
 36 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 37 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 38 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 39 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 40 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 813–16 (2007). 
 41 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (suspicion-less road-
blocks only allowed to serve “special needs” not regular law enforcement); Michigan 
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 440 (1990) (random sobriety checkpoints are 
constitutional); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (allowing war-
rantless inventory searches of impounded cars). 
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other.  But there is no general purpose to the government actions 
that will give rise to Crawford claims.  For example, 911 calls have both 
attributes, as do lab reports, and statements by children reporting 
sexual abuse, and so on.  Recognizing this, the Court has to, but does 
not want to, refer to internal intentional states, and thus this bastard-
ized quasi-objective, quasi-subjective test. 
I think there are deeper issues ahead, frankly.  The Court has, 
apparently unknowingly, walked into a jurisprudential minefield.  
Virtually all knowledge is “testimonial” or rests on the “testimony” of 
other, as Coady in his book, Testimony42 has pointed out convincingly.  
Consider, for example, the presentation of DNA testimony at trial 
showing a high probability that a specimen matches the defendant’s 
DNA, and assume the lab technician that has run the tests shows-up 
and is cross-examined.  All she can be cross-examined about is the re-
sults that emerge from following certain protocols.  She can’t testify 
about the theory of DNA.  Suppose she could; how does she know it is 
true?  Who is really doing the testifying here?  Obviously the scientists 
who have convinced their peers of the truth of their account of DNA, 
but they won’t be testifying at trial. 
But, the retort comes, they don’t have to testify because they 
were not thinking of testifying when they did their experiments.  
What if they were?  What if the people in some research center are 
aware that their work may have legal implications, as frankly virtually 
all research today might?  More importantly, in an effort to avoid 
“ambiguity” it seems as though the Court simply has recapitulated the 
troublesome problem in the hearsay rule involving the intent to as-
sert: if a person intends to assert, it’s hearsay; if not, maybe not.  I 
doubt anyone with experience with that aspect of the hearsay rule will 
think that the “primary motive, objectively determined” standard is 
likely to be less ambiguous than the straight forward question about 
reliability that Roberts asks.  An example of the enormous ambiguity 
Roberts injects into the system is the recent Seventh Circuit case of 
United States v. Moon,43 concluding that, since experts can testify on 
the basis of inadmissible data, Crawford may be avoided, and that, in 
any event, readings from tests are not testimonial.44
That leaves the last possible advantage of the Crawford regime, 
which is that it has in fact greater fidelity to the constitutional lan-
guage.  I must confess that, were I convinced of this being true, I 
would put aside all my objections.  At the heart of the argument that I 
 42 C.A.J. COADY, TESTIMONY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1992). 
 43 512 F.3d 359 (2008). 
 44 Id. at 361–62. 
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have been making here is that constitutional interpretation is not re-
ally interpretation; it is prudence.  For reasons I have given, I largely 
believe that.  At the same time, it is troublesome, for it makes the ex-
istence of the written language largely irrelevant.  To some extent, 
Crawford represents a struggle over the proper role of courts, and as 
ironic as it may sound, I am largely on Scalia’s side.  I prefer democ-
ratic to authoritarian sources of law.  I just do not see how to recap-
ture our lost innocence without declaring that the Constitution has 
become largely irrelevant.  Thus, constitutional law is primarily pru-
dence with some guideposts alone the way. 
Now at the conclusion, let me switch my hats again, and retake 
the mantle of an evidence professor.  If any question, constitutional 
or otherwise, is going to be fought out over the field of policy, the 
single most important policy is factual accuracy.  There may be other 
values, and at the end of the day they may outweigh the gains to fac-
tual accuracy that may be at play in some policy choice, but it is our 
job to ensure that the primacy of facts is never neglected. 
Thank you. 
